Part of my 2026 stock pick series – one stock per week from Consumer Discretionary, Industrials, or Health Care.
I’m writing this on February 20, three weeks after gold crashed 12% and silver fell 31% on January 31. While precious metals collapsed and Nasdaq struggled (down 3% YTD), healthcare quietly held steady. UltraGreen climbed 20% from its December IPO – no drama, just steady progress.
I own shares in a company most people have never heard of. They make a fluorescent dye surgeons use during operations – basically “night vision” for surgery. Listed on SGX in December 2025 at US$1.45, now trading around US$1.74 (as of Feb 19, 2026).
SAGES just published guidelines recommending this dye (ICG) for colorectal surgery. Europe did it in 2023, Japan in 2024. Clinical data: 50% fewer leaks in colorectal surgery, 51% fewer complications in breast reconstruction. Only 21% of applicable surgeries use ICG. UltraGreen owns 68% of that market – meaning they control 68% of a market that’s only penetrated 21% of potential. Guidelines drive adoption over 2-3 years. Market grows, UltraGreen captures most of it.
Analysts target US$2 (15% upside). Not interesting.
I’m looking 3-5 years out when cameras and AI software could be 30-40% of revenue. That’s when this stops being a medical supplies company and becomes a platform business – lease the camera, sell the dye, charge for software. Nespresso model. That’s when US$4-5 becomes possible.
What They Do
UltraGreen makes ICG (indocyanine green), a fluorescent dye surgeons inject during operations. You inject it into the patient’s bloodstream, shine a near-infrared camera on them, and the dye lights up showing exactly where blood is flowing in real-time.
Think about a surgeon reconnecting someone’s intestine after removing a tumor. The critical question is whether there’s enough blood flow to the reconnection point. Without ICG, surgeons guess based on how the tissue looks. With ICG, they can see it. It’s like driving at night – you can do it without headlights, but why would you?
The dye’s been around since 1959, but adoption only took off in the last 5 years as cameras got cheaper and clinical studies proved it works. FY2024 they sold US$115M of ICG vials (95% of revenue), growing 59% year-over-year. The rest comes from cameras they just launched and some R&D projects.
UltraGreen controls 68% of the global ICG market – about 3× bigger than #2 competitor Stryker (24%). They got this dominant by consolidating: CEO Ravi Sajwan bought PULSION Medical Systems’ ICG business in 2015 (they were #2 at the time), then bought Akorn’s ICG assets after Akorn went bankrupt in 2023 (Akorn had been the US leader for 60+ years). So PULSION (#2) + Akorn (#1) = 68% market share today.
The remaining 8% is split among tiny regional players like SERB, Hanlim, Daiichi Sankyo, Aurolab – none of them matter globally.
Geography: 83% market share in the US (60-70% of revenue), 94% in Europe (25-30% of revenue), and they’re just starting to build in Asia (5-10% of revenue today). They raised US$400M in the December IPO, paid off all debt, now sitting on cash.
Beyond the dye, they’re building IC-Flow cameras (just launched, competing with Stryker’s cameras but leasing instead of selling) and AI software (coming 2027, subscription model that analyzes the images). They’re trying to own the whole ecosystem – dye, camera, software.
Why They Keep Winning
Making sterile injectable drugs isn’t easy. FDA approval takes years. You need pharmaceutical-grade manufacturing, country-by-country approvals. Multi-year and expensive before first sale.
The raw ingredient (API) for ICG can only be produced by a handful of companies globally. UltraGreen locked down exclusive deals with the two main suppliers: WeylChem in Germany and TopChem in Ireland (TopChem pending FDA approval for early 2026). No readily available alternatives.
Once hospitals validate your ICG and train surgeons on it, they’re sticky. Switching requires re-validation, paperwork, testing. Since ICG is less than 1% of surgery costs, hospitals care more about availability than price. That’s why profit margins expanded from 56% to 63% over the past few years – if competition were intense, margins would be shrinking.
FY2024: $115M revenue, $71M profit (62% margin). They don’t own factories – outsource everything to contract manufacturers. Focus on regulatory approvals, quality control, distribution.
The business converts about 71% of profits into cash. After the IPO they paid off all debt. Printing money, not burning it.
ICG is a rounding error in surgical budgets—less than 2% of procedure costs. Stryker charges 2× what UltraGreen charges and hospitals barely notice. The constraint isn’t ‘will hospitals pay more?’ but ‘at what price do we invite new competitors?’ UltraGreen is pricing for market share, not margin maximization.
In FY2024 they raised prices 45%, then another 39% in June 2025 (from US$144 to US$200 per vial). Why could they get away with this? COVID supply chain shortages, market dominance, and ICG being <1% of surgery costs. Management says pricing has “normalized” now – future growth comes from volume, not more price hikes.
Why This Could Grow
SAGES guidelines (November 2025), European guidelines (2023), Japanese guidelines (2024) – these drive hospital protocol changes over 2-3 years. Current 21% penetration means 79% of procedures don’t use ICG yet. As penetration climbs toward 40-50%, UltraGreen captures most of that growth.
Asia-Pacific is the real opportunity. Being Singapore-headquartered gives them local credibility. Global ICG market grows 8-10% annually, Asia grows 16.6%. China: 41% penetration for breast reconstruction but under-penetrated for other surgeries. Japan: less than 40% for gallbladder surgery, less than 30% for colon surgery. Korea, Thailand, Indonesia barely started.
US$22M from the IPO goes to Asia expansion. Applications pending in Singapore, Japan, South Korea. Right now 60-70% of revenue comes from Americas – growing Asia to 15-20% diversifies that. Plus camera leasing works better in Asia where hospitals can’t drop US$50-100K upfront.
The camera business could matter. Hospitals already own Stryker cameras but increasingly buy UltraGreen’s cheaper dye – they’re unbundling. If UltraGreen can lease cameras at monthly fees and lock hospitals into multi-year contracts, that’s recurring revenue. And Stryker probably won’t fight too hard – ICG is only 0.18% of Stryker’s total revenue.
AI software platform launches in 2027. Subscription-based. They already know which hospitals use ICG, which ones lease cameras – now add software that analyzes the images. Recurring revenue across the ecosystem.
Right now analysts assume this stays a pure dye business. If cameras and software start showing up in earnings, the valuation changes.
They’re also launching Fluorescein (different dye for eye procedures) in 2026 and invested in Ferronova (nanoparticle cancer imaging, early stage). Smaller bets, but shows they’re thinking beyond just ICG.
What Could Go Wrong
ICG dye has no patent (been around since 1959), but that’s fine – commoditized dye means easy adoption. The question is whether cameras and AI software have strong IP protection. The company hasn’t disclosed their patent strategy. If competitors can easily replicate the imaging system and software, the ecosystem advantage disappears.
68% of revenue flows through three US wholesalers (AmerisourceBergen, Cardinal Health, McKesson). They’re just distributors, not end customers, but losing one would hurt.
Right now one main supplier for the raw ingredient (WeylChem in Germany). TopChem (Ireland) is pending FDA approval for early 2026. Until approved, single-source risk. Factory fire at WeylChem? Revenue stops.
The 21% penetration number comes from a Frost & Sullivan study commissioned by the company. If penetration climbs to 40% by 2030, revenue nearly doubles from market expansion alone – before adding cameras and software.
UltraGreen acquired most of its market share by buying Akorn’s ICG assets after Akorn went bankrupt in 2023. What killed Akorn? Quality control failures, US$80M in government pricing violations, and massive debt (US$861M) they couldn’t service. Management and compliance failures – not problems with the ICG business itself. While Akorn was failing, the ICG market was growing and other players were profitable.
UltraGreen runs a different model. They don’t own factories – outsource everything (WeylChem, ThermoFisher, LyoContract). 63% margins. Instead of 143 products like Akorn, they’re building an ecosystem around one category. Whether asset-light is better than asset-heavy is debatable, but focused strategy on ICG is clearly working where Akorn’s scattered approach across 143 generic drugs failed.
Supply chain risk remains. If WeylChem has quality issues or shuts down, UltraGreen can’t make product. The difference is they can switch suppliers without shutting down owned factories. TopChem has been in development since 2020 (5 years!), FDA approval expected Q1 2026.
The whole thesis depends on cameras and software working. If hospitals don’t want to lease cameras or the software isn’t compelling, this stays a boring dye business with limited upside.
Conclusion
At US$1.74, UltraGreen isn’t worth owning if it stays a boring dye business. Analysts say US$2 (15% upside). Not interesting.
The reason to own it: platform transformation. Cameras and AI software contributing 30-40% of revenue by 2028-2030. That’s when this stops being medical supplies and becomes a platform business. Dye gives you 1-2% of procedure economics. Dye + camera lease + software subscription gives you 5-10%. That’s when the market re-rates this from medical supplies (current 21× earnings) to platform business, and US$4-5 becomes possible.
The downside is protected. Profitable dye monopoly – 63% margins, 59% growth, cash-generating, no debt. Global guidelines driving adoption, Asia expansion. If cameras/software flop, you’re stuck with a boring dye business at US$1.74 that might drift to US$2.
This is a 3-5 year position, not “hold forever.” The thesis either works by 2028-2030, or it doesn’t.
Even if everything works, global ICG market is only US$335M by 2030. Add cameras and software, maybe US$350M total revenue. This caps upside at roughly 3× from here – a quality compounder, not a 10-bagger.
Key questions: camera revenue traction, software platform development timeline, TopChem approval status, Asia expansion progress, IP strategy for cameras and software. Feb 26 earnings call may provide some clarity.
For a profitable monopoly with a credible shot at platform transformation over 3-5 years? The risk/reward works.
It is not financial advice. The author may hold positions in securities discussed. Readers should conduct their own due diligence and consult with a qualified financial advisor before making investment decisions.